| Judul | Abstract | Halaman |
|---|
| Export control of natural resources: WTO panel rulling on the Chinese export restrictions of natural resources | The panel held that the Chinese measures were inconsistent with Article XI:1 and that the justifications under article XI:2(c) as well as Article XX: (b) and (g) could not be upheld. Part IV examines the key themes present in the dispute and also summarily scrutinizes the supplementary questions involved. More spesifically, it deals with the question of whether a Member can resort to Article XX: (b) and (g) to control the production of natural resources and impose export quotas on them. Part V offers a conclusion with regard to the formulation of certain principles regarding expert controls and the role of the WTO in implementing them. | 267-295 |
| Development as an international right: Investment in the new trade-based IIAs | The inherent fluidity of the concept of development, coupled with the absence of any language within Article 25 of the ICSID on the international right to development, further supports the view that the Convention did not intend to impose development contributions as a strict condition or mandatory criterion before gaining access in ICSID jurisdiction. | 296-333 |
| Why the amicus curia institution is ill-suited to address indigenous people rights before investor-state arbitration tribunals: Glamis gold and the right of intervention | This article argues that such restrictions should be tempered in the case of indigenous peoples, in the light of their distinct cultural identity and the right to self-determination. To avoid the defenselessness of indigenous peoples and potential areas of overlap with their human rights, this article purposes the incorporation into international arbitration of the procedural institution of intervention -- as opposed to amicus -- from municipal law. | 334-366 |
| Doha, Dohalf, or Dohaha? The WTO licks its wounds | This is the first time that they have announced we do it for development and they now risk delivering nothing. Something has got to give at this stage, and we are running out of time as far as options regarding deliverables are concerned. The accent has correctly been placed on priority issues for the bottom billion. The WTO, even if this effort succeeds, will have to face tough tests in the near future arising from issues which were not at all addressed during the Doha Round. | 367-381 |
| Toleration of temporary non-compliance: The systemic safety valve of WTO dispute settlement revisited | This review support the conclusions that WTO legal framework provides WTO Members with a balanced compromise between legal security and flexibility, with reputational concerns acting as the key incentive towards compliance. It is this compromise between legal security and flexibility which ensures that sovereign states remain willing to give up large parts of their freedom of action in trade matters of adhering to the WTO in the first place, and participate in future rounds of trade liberalization. In light of the analysis provided in this article, any calls for equipping the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with tougher sanctions appear misguided | 382-406 |
| Developing countries and intellectual property enforcement measures: Improving access to medicines through WTO dispute settlement | These disputes are different from all prior ones -- they are premised upon the claim that the EU violated the TRIPS agreement through use of its border measures that went beyond the TRIPS minimum standards, rather than claiming that the other country did not meet those minimum obligations. They also show how developed countries seek to enact such intellectual property standards outside the WTO and limit global access to medicines. This note examines how developing countries can use the DSU to challenge these restrictions and pursue policies that promote global access to medicines. | 407-440 |
