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Performance and Agency Conflict in Managerial Decision : Ownership Culture, Diversification and Size
In managing a business, entrepreneurs are required to maintain good company performance. However, various conditions experienced by their company sometimes hinder them from achieving the desired performance. The difference between the decision-making function (i.e.,the agent/manager) and the risk-taking function (i.e., the owners of the company) may lead to a conflict between the agent and the owner. In the agency perspective, there is an inherent conflict of interest attached to the relationship between the agent (manager) and the owner of the company. This conflict can manifest in managerial decisions such as defining the ownership structure in the company, formulating the decisions about business diversification, and determining the company size. Consequently, a number of mechanisms are needed to reduce agency conflicts in order that the company’s financial performance can be well maintained.
In the real world, many large profit organizations and non-profit organizations (including higher education institutions) have been successful in their fields, but have experienced significant shocks, the main cause of which is the conflict between the owner and the agent/manager. Considering the number of cases where the company performance was damaged due to the agency conflict is the reason motivating the author to write this book. The contents of the book are derived from reading the research reports on the relevant topic and the author’s own research reports.
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